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Introduction 
Forensic evidence, and in particular deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) evidence, has made 
successful breakthroughs in modern-day law enforcement.  In today’s society, “forensic DNA 
typing has rapidly gained approval as admissible, even decisive, evidence concerning tissue 
material left at a crime scene.”1  Given the uniqueness of a person’s DNA, forensic DNA 
evidence has tremendously benefited the criminal system worldwide not only because it helps 
law enforcement in identifying those guilty of a crime, but because it similarly protects the 
innocent.2    
Recognizing these benefits, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
Government have adopted DNA collection statutes, which, although not identical, are similar to 
each other.3  The Federal DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 20004 (“the DNA Act”) 
requires the mandatory collection of a “DNA sample” from every person convicted of a 
qualifying federal offense5 for the purpose of including the offender’s genetic profile in the 
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”).  
The DNA Act defines “DNA sample” as “a tissue, fluid or other bodily sample of an 
individual on which DNA analysis can be carried out.”6  However, in enforcing the DNA Act, 
the FBI Federal Convicted Offenders Program (“the Program”) has only validated protocols for 
                     
1 Vanderlinden v. State of Kan.,  874 F.Supp. 1210, 1213 (D.Kan. 1995). 
2 See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2005). 
3 See People v. Garvin, 349 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (listing DNA statutes and 
cases from all 50 states); See also  http:// www.dnaresource.com (regularly-updated list of state 
DNA collection statutes). 
4 42 U.S.C.§ 14135, et. seq.; Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000). 
5 Qualifying Federal offenses include homicide, crimes relating to sexual abuse or sexual 
exploitation, kidnapping, and offenses involving robbery or burglary, etc. See 42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(d). 
6 § 14135a(c)(1). 
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the collection and analysis of whole blood samples as the DNA sample.  
Members of different religious organizations, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, sincerely 
believe that blood is sacred and that giving or receiving blood is prohibited by their religious 
doctrine.7  The thesis of this paper is that if a religious objector meets his prima facie case, the 
federal Government will not be able to meet its burden of showing that the mandatory collection 
of blood by the finger stick technique is the least intrusive means of furthering the Government’s 
compelling interests under RFRA’s strict scrutiny test.   
Part I presents a factual scenario that serves as basis for this paper.  Part II serves as an 
overview to the statutory and regulatory framework of the DNA Act.  Part III presents the 
different challenges to the DNA collections statutes and the reasons why the courts have upheld 
the challenges. Part IV briefly discusses RFRA and its applicable test.  Part V presents an 
argument of how a religious objector can meet his prima facie case and proposes an argument 
supporting the position that the federal Government will not be able to meet its burden under 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny test.  Part VI presents a brief conclusion. 
                     
7 See Part V of a discussion addressing the Jehovah’s Witnesses position on blood. 
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I. My Blood is Sacred:  A Factual Scenario 
Your client was convicted of a qualified federal offense.8  As such, he is subject to the 
mandatory collection of a sample of his DNA under the DNA Act9 and he is required to 
cooperate with the collection of such sample as a condition of his supervised release.10  
The Probation Officer has requested your client to provide his blood sample for the 
creation of his DNA profile.11  However, your client refused to provide the blood sample as 
instructed.   
The Probation Officer filed a petition12 requesting the court to compel your client to 
provide a blood sample for DNA testing or, in the alternative, to revoke or extend the terms of 
your client’s supervised release.13  The petition has two counts.14  Count One alleges that your 
client violated the law by refusing to submit a blood sample for mandatory DNA testing.15  
Count Two alleges that your client violated a condition of his probation by failing to follow the 
                     
8 Qualifying Federal offenses include homicide, crimes relating to sexual abuse or sexual 
exploitation, kidnapping, and offenses involving robbery or burglary, etc. See 42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(d). 
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), and (a)(2) (requiring convicted felons to provide their DNA and 
genetic profile to be included in CODIS); see also U.S. v. Stegman, 295 F.Supp.2d 542, 
549 (D.Md. 2003) (recognizing that the DNA Act applies to current federal prisoners and 
individuals who are on supervised release, probation, or parole).  
10 See § 14135c (requiring cooperation in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of 
probation, parole, or supervised release). 
11 See § 14135a(a)(2) (requiring the federal probation officer to collect a DNA sample from an 
individual on federal supervised release).   
12 See § 14135a(a)(4)(A) (authorizing the probation officer to use any reasonably and necessary 
means to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from a supervisee who refuses to give a 
sample).  
13 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)-(3) (authorizes the Court to revoke or extend the term of supervised 
release). 
14  The failure to provide DNA sample violates two mandatory release conditions:  not commit 
another federal, state, or local offense; and submit to DNA sampling.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(1)&(8).   
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5) (classifying the convicted offender’s failure to cooperate in the 
collection of the DNA sample as a class A misdemeanor).   
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instructions of the probation officer.16    
However, your client is not refusing to provide a DNA sample.  As he explained to you, 
he is refusing to “give blood” because he is a Jehovah’s Witness, and as such he adheres to the 
belief that to give or receive blood is a violation of God’s laws, and that God will punish those 
who violates it.17  Your client assures you that he is willing to give his DNA sample through 
buccal swab, hair, body tissue, or any other type of bodily sample from which his DNA profile 
can be obtained, except blood.   
You moved to dismiss under the theory that your client is a religious objector. In your 
motion to dismiss, you are not challenging the Constitutionality of the DNA Act.  Rather, you 
are claiming that the Federal Convicted Offender Program’s mandatory collection of a blood 
sample, in the light of other less intrusive methods readily available combined with your client’s 
religious opposition violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  You request the 
Court to allow your client to provide his DNA sample through a saliva swab in lieu of blood. 
Will your motion be granted?   
 
II.    The DNA Act: An overview of the Act’s statutory and regulatory framework  
“DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the building block for the human body; virtually 
every cell contains DNA.”18  The DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA in his saliva, 
skin tissue, hair, and bone.  A person’s DNA does not change throughout a person’s life.19   With 
                     
16 See note 14 supra. 
17 See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ill. 1965)  (“members of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses regard themselves commanded by God to neither give nor receive … blood”).  
18 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service 
Providers, http://ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/publications/dna_evbro/index.html 
19 Id. 
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the exception of identical twins, no two people have the same DNA.20   
A person’s DNA is unique.21  Given its uniqueness, DNA evidence plays an important 
role in criminal cases throughout the country, both to convict the guilty and to exonerate those 
wrongly accused or convicted.22   
Modern scientific techniques allow people to be identified through their DNA. 
Recognizing the benefits of DNA collection, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 199423 (“the 1994 Act”).  The 1994 Act authorized the FBI to create an 
index of DNA samples obtained from convicted offenders, crime scenes, and from unidentified 
human remains.24   In response, the FBI created the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”).25   
“CODIS is a national index of DNA samples taken from convicted offenders, crime 
scenes, victims of crime, and unidentified human remains.”26  CODIS databases enables “State 
and local forensic laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically… to link 
evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted 
offenders” whose DNA is already in the system.27  Currently, every state, the United States 
                     
20 Id.  
21 See States v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 22 (Md. 2004) (accepting DNA evidence and recognizing 
that the statistical probability of anyone other than appellee being the source of the DNA of the 
attacker to be one in six billion). 
22 See note 2 supra.  
23 42 U.S.C. § 13701-14223; Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994). 
24 See id. § 14132(a)(1).   
25 See id. § 14132(a) (authorizing the FBI to establish CODIS). Even though the 1994 Act 
formalized the FBI’s authority to establish a national DNA index for law enforcement purposes, 
CODIS began as a pilot project in 1990 serving 14 state and local laboratories. In October 1998, 
the FBI’s National DNA Index System (NDIS) became operational. Today, CODIS is 
implemented as a distributed database with three hierarchical levels: local, state, and national. 
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The FBI’s Combined DNA Index System Program – CODIS, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 2006). 
26 United States v. Miles, 228 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1132 (E.D.Cal. 2002) (internal citations omitted).   
27 United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting constitutional 
challenges to the DNA Act) (internal citations omitted).   
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Army, the FBI, and Puerto Rico share DNA profiles through CODIS.28 
In an appropriations act, Congress required the Department of Justice to submit to it an 
implementation plan for collecting DNA samples from qualified convicted offenders.29  In 
December 1998, the FBI’s Laboratory submitted to Congress its report titled “Implementation 
Plan for Collection of DNA Samples from Federal Convicted Offenders pursuant to P.L. 105-
229[sic].”30  As reflected in that report, the Program underwent a thorough investigation and 
conducted numerous studies to evaluate the different types of DNA samples and decided to 
collect whole blood via venipuncture31 as the biological sample for DNA analysis.32  The 
decision to collect blood was based on the FBI’s findings that other collection methods of DNA 
sample, such as buccal swabs, hair, skin cells, etc., did not consistently provide the quality and 
quantity of DNA necessary for the testing procedures employed.33    
In April of 1999, the FBI issued its Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA 
Testing (“Quality Assurance Standards), as required by the 1994 Act.34   Every laboratory that 
participates in CODIS must comply with the Quality Assurance Standards.35   
  Congress wanted to expand CODIS by providing legal authority for the collection of 
                     
28 Participating States, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/partstates.htm (last visited Nov. 2006). 
29 Pub. L. 105-119, H.R. 2267, § 121, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).   
30 See FBI Laboratory Report to Congress, Implementation Plan for Collection of DNA Samples 
from Federal Convicted Offenders Pursuant to P.L. 105-229 (December 1998). Pub. L. 105-119, 
§121 (appropriations act required the Attorney General to submit a report to Congress with an 
implementation plan for collecting DNA samples) (hereinafter FBI Report). 
31 The finger stick, a less intrusive method than venipuncture, has replaced venipuncture, and is 
the standard method currently in use for collecting blood samples. 
32 FBI Report, p. 19, see note 30 supra.  
33 Id.    
34 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a)(2); the FBI’s quality assurance standards are publicly available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/qualassur.htm. 
35 The Quality Assurance Standards cover the following subjects: organization and management, 
personnel, facilities, evidence control, validation, analytical procedures, equipment calibration 
and maintenance, reports, review, proficiency testing, corrective action, audits, safety and use of 
subcontractor laboratories.  
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DNA samples from persons convicted of Federal crimes.36   Therefore, in the exercise of its 
power under the Commerce Clause, Congress enacted the Federal DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act of 200037 (“the DNA Act”).   
Under the DNA Act a qualified federal convicted offender (“qualified offender”) is 
required to provide a sample of his DNA to include his genetic profile in the Combined DNA 
Index System (“CODIS”) maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).38  The 
DNA Act requires the collection of a DNA sample from those who had been convicted of certain 
federal crimes and who were incarcerated, or on parole, probation, or supervised released.39   
The FBI’s Federal Convicted Offenders Program (“the Program”) oversees the collection 
and analysis of DNA samples obtained from the qualified offender.  Once a DNA sample is 
collected from a qualified offender, the completed test kit is sent to the FBI Laboratory for 
inclusion in CODIS.40   
The FBI requires laboratories participating in CODIS to use only validated methods and 
procedures for DNA analysis.41  The Program’s laboratory, as one of the laboratories 
participating in CODIS, is required to use validated methods and procedures for analyzing the 
DNA samples.  Based in part on the FBI’s determination that blood samples are more reliable 
and of greater quality, the Program has only validated42 protocols for the analysis of blood. 43  
                     
36 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I) at 8-11, 17 (2000); 106th Cong. § 2 (2000). 
37 42 U.S.C.§ 14135, et. seq.; Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000). 
38 Id. 
39  See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d). 
40 See id. § 14135a(b); See United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 2004). 
41 See FBI, Standards for Quality Assurance, § 8.1 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/qualassur.htm. 
42 “Validation is a process by which a procedure is evaluated to determine its efficacy and 
reliability for DNA analysis and includes: (1) Developmental validation is the acquisition of test 
data and determination of conditions and limitations of a new or novel DNA methodology for 
use on samples. (2) Internal validation is an accumulation of test data within the laboratory to 
demonstrate that established methods and procedures perform as expected in the laboratory.” See 
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III.   Solid as a rock:  unsuccessful challenges to the DNA Act 
 Defendants from all across the nation have challenged the constitutionality of the DNA 
Act under many constitutional theories. 44  Nonetheless, the courts have overwhelmingly upheld 
the DNA Act and its analogous state statutes.45  This section will review some of the most 
common challenges presented to the courts.  
 
a. The collection of DNA samples under the DNA Act does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons…  
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”46   To pass constitutional muster under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search must be reasonable because “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”47   
Those subjected to the mandatory collection of their DNA sample, have claimed that the 
compelled collection of their DNA sample violates their Fourth Amendment’s rights against 
                                                                  
Definitions Standards for Convicted Offenders Labs, Art. 2, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/offender.htm 
43 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 
(2005), (upholding DNA Act under the Fourth Amendment and acknowledging that the FBI 
guidelines require those subject to the DNA Act to submit to a compulsory blood sampling 
because the FBI considers DNA information derived from blood samples to be more reliable 
than that obtained from other sources).   
44 For a complete discussion of the different challenges to the DNA Act see Richard P. Shafer, 
Validity, Construction, and Application of DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 187 
A.L.R. Fed. 373 (2006) (originally published in 2003). 
45 Except for the case of United States v. Miles, 228 F.Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding 
that the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to a defendant who was convicted 
of a qualifying offense 30 years ago and has fully served his sentence for that crime), this writer 
has been unable to find any other reported or unreported case finding the DNA Act to be 
unconstitutional.     
46 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
47 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
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unreasonable searches because it is executed without warrant and without individualized 
suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing.  Courts have been consistent in holding the DNA statutes 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  As one state court judge recognized:   
This garden-variety … of case[s] [raising] a Fourth Amendment 
question… has commanded the attention of federal and state courts 
across the nation. The same answer keeps coming up-- the 
Government can require a convicted felon to undergo a blood or 
saliva test for submission to state and national DNA databanks 
without individualized suspicion that the felon has committed 
some other crime.48  
 
However, while unanimous in their decisions to uphold the statutes because its 
reasonableness, the courts are split as to whether to apply the “totality of the circumstances” test 
or the “special needs” exception.  The difference between the two is simple.  To uphold a 
Government’s action under the “special needs” exception, all that is required is that there is an 
absence of any law enforcement motive underlying the challenged search.  On the other hand, 
the “totality of the circumstances” test is a more rigorous standard.  Under the “totality of the 
circumstances” standard, to uphold a Government’s action, the court must balance the invasion 
of defendant’s interest in privacy against the Government’s interest in the search without a 
warrant supported by probable cause.49   
Without excluding the possibility that the totality of the circumstances test might validate 
the collection of blood of the DNA Act, the Second, Tenth Circuits, along with many federal 
district courts and at least two state Supreme Courts, have upheld DNA collection statutes under 
the special needs test arguing that the DNA Act’s primary purpose is not ordinary law 
                     
48 See People v. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (upholding Illinois 
DNA statute). 
49 For an interesting discussion of these two tests see United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 
832-32 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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enforcement.50  On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, along with a variety of 
federal district courts and state courts, have endorsed the DNA collection statutes under the 
totality of the circumstances test.51  Courts upholding the DNA Act under the totality of the 
circumstances test have found the Act’s primary purpose to be law enforcement.   
Generally speaking, the DNA Act has been held to be in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment under both the special needs test and the totality of the circumstances test because 
those subject to the DNA Act do not enjoy the same privacy interest as “free persons.” The 
courts have reasoned that blood tests are common and widely used without involving risk, 
trauma, or pain, and the DNA profile establishes only the defendant’s identity.   
In addition, courts have identified other compelling interests furthered by the DNA Act 
such as deterring future crimes, reducing recidivism, solving past crimes, and absolving the 
innocent. 
b. The DNA Act is not vague 
 
The DNA Act has been challenged under the theory that the language of the statute is 
vague because it gives to the probation officer too much discretion.  The courts have rejected 
these challenges.52  “A statute violates due process of law if it either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application. The same principles apply to a condition of supervised 
release.”53   
In upholding the statute, the Ninth Circuit held that the language of the DNA Act is not 
                     
50 Id. at 830-31. 
51 Id. at 831.  
52 See, e.g., United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2004). 
53 Id. at 768 (internal citations omitted). 
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vague.54  The language of the DNA Act clearly requires the person subject to it to provide a 
DNA Sample.  In addition, the DNA Act does not give a federal probation officer too much 
discretion because the officer must follow extensive rules, restrictions, and procedures outlined 
by the FBI, the Attorney General and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in 
collecting and maintaining the blood samples.55 
c. The DNA Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.56  Challengers of the DNA Act have 
unsuccessfully claimed that compelled extraction of blood samples violates the Fifth 
Amendment right guaranteed by the Constitution.57  In rejecting this argument, courts have relied 
almost exclusively in the Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California.58   The following 
discussion of Schmerber illustrates the courts’ rationale in rejecting Fifth Amendment challenges 
to the DNA Act. 
In Schmerber, the petitioner was involved in a car accident.59  While petitioner was in the 
hospital receiving treatment for his injuries, the police officer requested a blood sample to be 
withdrawn from petitioner’s body by a physician at the hospital and tested.60  The blood test 
                     
54 Id. at 769. 
55 Id. at 768-69. 
56 U.S. Const. amend. V.   
57 See, e.g., Vore v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 281 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Ariz. 2003) (finding 
defendant’s argument that the DNA Act violates his privilege against self-incrimination 
meritless); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1174 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (defendant’s 
argument that the DNA Act violates his privilege against self-incrimination does not even 
require serious scrutiny). 
58 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
59 Id. at 758. 
60 Id. 
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revealed that the petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the offense.61  This analysis was 
admitted into evidence at the trial and the petitioner was convicted for driving an automobile 
while under the influence of alcohol.62  Petitioner objected to the introduction of the analysis into 
evidence, claiming that it violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.63  
In rejecting the Fifth Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court held that “the privilege 
[against self-incrimination] protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against 
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, 
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve 
compulsion to these ends.”64  The Court found that when the issue is solely compelling 
extraction of blood, and no “shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication 
by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis,” the person’s 
testimonial capacities are not implicated and the Fifth Amendment offers no protection.65  
Accordingly, the Court held that the blood test evidence was neither testimonial in nature nor 
related to some communicative act or writing and, therefore, it cannot be excluded on privilege 
grounds.66   
Likewise, courts faced with a challenge to the DNA Act under the privilege against self-
incrimination have agreed that while a blood test can be potentially incriminating, it is not 
testimonial in character nor is it evidence related to any communicative act and as such, the 
involuntary collection of blood does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.67 
                     
61 Id. at 759. 
62 Id. at 758-59. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 761. 
65 Id. at 765. 
66 Id. at 765. 
67 Id. at 765 
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d. The DNA Act is not an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder 68 
 
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall not pass a Bill of Attainder.69   
“A Bill of Attainder is a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an 
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a jury trial.”70  Therefore, for a law 
to constitute a Bill of Attainder, three elements must be present in the challenged law.  “The law 
must: (1) single out an identifiable group; (2) inflict punishment; and (3) dispense with a judicial 
trial.”71   
In attacking the Constitutionality of the DNA Act, defendants advanced the argument that 
the DNA Act is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder because the Act exhibits all of the above 
three elements of a Bill of Attainder.  They claim the DNA Act singles out individuals based on 
their past commission of qualified offenses, punishes them by requiring them to provide blood 
and by authorizing detention of those who refuse, and imposes punishment without a judicial 
trial.72 
   In Bill of Attainder cases, the courts have agreed, and the Government has generally 
conceded, that the DNA Act does single out an identifiable group by requiring application of a 
DNA collection only to probationers, parolees, or individuals on supervised release.73  However, 
courts have found that the other two elements necessary for a Bill of Attainder, i.e. punishment 
                     
68 In United States v. Reynard, the court explained how Bill of Attainder and an Ex Post Facto 
laws are different, although the concepts overlap. The court explained that an ex post facto law is 
necessarily backward-looking because it imposes punishment only for past offenses while a Bill 
of Attainder may punish retroactively it may also punish prospectively. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1163 (S.D. Cal. 2002).   
69 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
70 Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210, 1217 (D.Kan. 1995) (holding the DNA is not a 
Bill of Attainder because the minimal intrusion imposed incident to the statute does not result in 
punishment).    
71 United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162-63 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding the 
DNA Act because it is not a Bill of Attainder). 
72 Id. at 1163.  
73 Id. at 1162-63.  
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and disposition without a judicial trial, are lacking.74 
  First, the DNA Act is not a Bill of Attainder because the “punishment” element is 
lacking. Even though the Act does place a new burden on those subject to it, this burden is not to 
“punish” the identifiable group; rather, the act promotes non-punitive goals such as the 
establishment of a national DNA database, and the achievement of greater accuracy in future 
adjudications of guilt and innocence.75  In addition, courts have found that “nothing in the 
legislative history suggests that members of Congress passed the DNA Act as a means of 
punishing qualifying individuals.”76 
  Second, the DNA Act is not a Bill of Attainder because the “dispense without a judicial 
trial” element is lacking.  The DNA Act does not deprive the identifiable group of a judicial 
trial.77  To support this conclusion, the courts found that when a probation officer petitions an 
Article III Court to revoke a supervised release due to defendant's violation of the DNA Act, the 
defendant receives a hearing in which he is allowed the opportunity to be heard and to present 
evidence on his behalf before a neutral fact finder.78  
e. The DNA Act does not violate Equal Protection Clause  
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen Amendment provides that no state shall 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”79  Thus, “[t]he threshold 
inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is ... whether a person is similarly situated to 
                     
74 Id.; See also note 70 supra. 
75 See United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2002).  
76 Id. at 1164.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 93 (D.D.C. 2005), affirmed, 440 F.3d 489 (2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 103 (U.S. 2006).  
 16
those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment.”80   If the statute classifies by race, 
sex, alienage, or national origin, the courts must apply a higher scrutiny standard; if the 
legislation does not classify by race, sex, alienage, or national origin, then the court will apply a 
“rationally related” standard and the legislation will be presumed to be valid if the classification 
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.81 
  Defendants challenging the DNA Act have encountered great difficulty in triggering 
strict scrutiny because from a simple reading of the statute it is clear that the DNA Act is a 
facially neutral statute.  The DNA Act makes no distinction between offenders on the basis of 
their race, sex, alienage, or national origin because if an offender is convicted of one of the 
qualifying offenses, then, without regard to the offender’s race, sex, alienage or national origin, 
he or she is required to submit a DNA sample.82   Thus, for a defendant to prove that a facially 
neutral statute violates equal protection guarantees, he must demonstrate a racially 
discriminatory purpose behind the statute.83  
  In Johnson v. Quander, Mr. Johnson challenged both the federal and state DNA Act 
under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the court should analyze his claim under the 
“strict scrutiny” standard because the statutory provisions of the DNA Act were created and 
implemented with discriminatory intent. 84  Specifically, Mr. Johnson argued that the DNA Act 
affects African Americans males in a disproportionate rate because they are incarcerated at a 
much higher rate than white males and, therefore, are more likely to be subject to the mandatory 
                     
80 Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 
(D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997).  
81 Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).  
82 Id. at 94-95.  
83 Id.   
84 Id. at 93.   
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DNA collection.85 
  The court found that even though a disparate racial impact could be probative of 
discriminatory intent, the showing of a disparate impact on the African American population by 
itself was not dispositive;  Johnson was still required to show that the DNA was enacted with a 
discriminatory purpose.86  The court found that absent a discriminatory intent, Johnson’s claim 
was to be evaluated under the rational basis standard.  As such, plaintiff’s challenge to the DNA 
Act under the Equal Protection clause must failed if the Act is “rationally related” to a legitimate 
state interest because under this standard the presumption is that the law is constitutional.87 
In analyzing a statute under the “rationally related” standard courts must be deferential to 
the legislative branch.  The following excerpt further explain this point:  
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from 
the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social 
and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither 
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification. Where there 
are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end. 
This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. The 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the 
democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political 
branch has acted.88  
 
  The court dismissed Johnson’s Equal Protection Claim holding that the DNA Act met the 
“rationally related” standard.  The court found that the Act met the “rationally related” standard 
because the DNA Act’s primarily purpose is to promote public safety by solving past and future 
                     
85 Id.   
86 Id. at 94.   
87 Id.   
88 FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993).  
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offenses.89 
 
f. The DNA Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause90  
 
Under the DNA Act, all persons convicted of a qualified offense are subject to the 
mandatory collection of their DNA sample.  This requirement applies equally to those convicted 
of a qualified offense after the enactment of the Act as well as those who were convicted before 
the enactment of the Act.91  The United States Constitution prohibits both the States and 
Congress from enacting any ex post facto law.92  For this reason, it is not surprising that the DNA 
and its analogous state statutes have been challenged under the theory that the Act violates the ex 
post facto clause of the Constitution. 
An ex post facto law is “a law that applies retroactively, especially in a way that 
negatively affects a person’s rights, by criminalizing an action that was legal when it was 
committed.”93  For a law to be ex post facto two elements must be met: the law must apply to 
events that occurred before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.94  
A law disadvantages the offender if such law aggravates a crime, and inflicts a greater 
                     
89 Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 94-5 (D.D.C. 2005). 
90 See note 68 supra. 
91 See, e.g., Cannon v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., 604 S.E.2d 709 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding 
South Carolina DNA Act and rejecting ex post facto claim of a probationee who was convicted 
of a qualified offense 23 years prior to the enactment of the Act and was to remain on probation 
for life); United States v. Sczulebelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 316 (D. Del. 2003) (upholding 
federal DNA Act and rejecting ex post facto claim of a supervisee who was convicted of a 
qualified offense six years prior to the enactment of the Act); Vore v. U.S. Department of Justice, 
281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (D. Ariz. 2003) (upholding the DNA Act even though the Act was 
enacted three years after defendant conviction of a qualified offense); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 
302 (4thc Cir. 1992) (upholding Virginia DNA statute and rejecting the Ex Post Facto Clause 
claim because a statute that is not penal cannot be ex post facto). 
92 U.S. Cons. Art. I § 10 cl. 1 (as applied to the states) and U.S. Cons. Art. I § 9 cl. 3 (as applied 
to the federal Government).  
93 See States v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 22 (Md. 2004) (finding the DNA Act constitutional and 
rejecting the Ex Post Facto Clause claim under both the Maryland and United States 
Constitution) (internal citations omitted). 
94 Id. at 34.  
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punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.95 
In ascertaining the constitutionality of the DNA Act under the ex post facto clause of the 
Constitution, courts, in general, look as to whether the Act in question is civil or punitive in 
nature.  To do so, many courts addressing the issue have looked for guidance from two major 
cases: States v. Raines and Smith v. Doe.96  In Smith, the United States Supreme Court explained:    
If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that 
ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a 
regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further 
examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the] intention to deem it civil.97  
 
  In general, every court has found that the DNA Act was not enacted with the purpose of 
punishing criminals for crimes already committed at the time of the enactment of the law.98  The 
rationale for this conclusion seems to be that the main purpose of the Act was to create a 
database to protect public safety by providing means to identify persons regardless of whether 
the person to be identified is the assailant, the victim, or one involved in crimes or accidents.99  
  In addition, there is consensus among the courts that the DNA Act does not amend 
substantive criminal laws.100   Even though the DNA Act does criminalize the qualified 
offender’s refusal to provide a DNA sample, it has been held that “such non-compliance is 
punished as a separate offense, which diminishes potential ex post facto problems.”101  
g. Other challenges to the DNA Act.  
                     
95 Id.   
96 Id. at 35; Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (upholding the Alaska Sex Offender Registration 
Act and rejecting Ex Post Facto Clause claim).  
97 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
98 See note 91 supra. 
99 Id.   
100 See United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1160-62 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
101 Id.   
 20
 As the title of this chapter suggests, the DNA Act has proven to be as “solid as a rock,” 
surviving every challenge it has faced.  In addition to those already mentioned in the above-
discussed sections, the DNA Act has also survived challenges under both the Commerce 
Clause102 and Separation of Powers Clause103 of the United States Constitution. 
 
 IV.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: an overview 
 
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Employment 
Division v. Smith.104  In Smith, the plaintiffs were members of the Native American Church.105  
They were fired from their employment because they ingested peyote during a sacramental 
ceremony.106  The Employment Division denied unemployment compensation to the plaintiffs 
because under Oregon Law the use of peyote was a criminal act.107  As such, the discharge was 
categorized as a work-related misconduct that disqualified the employees from unemployment 
compensation benefits.108   
The United States Supreme Court found the Oregon criminal law to be constitutional.  
The Court held that religion-neutral laws of general applicability need not to be justified under 
the strict scrutiny test even if such law has the effect of burdening a particular religious 
                     
102 Id. at 1173 (upholding the DNA Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power 
because the Act regulates a ‘thing in interstate commerce’ by regulating the collection and 
distribution of the DNA data for distribution and use around the country). 
103 See United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F.Supp.2d 315, 324 (D.Del. 2003), aff’d, 402 F.3d 175, 
185 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding the Federal DNA Act and rejecting the proposition that the Act 
violated the separation of power clause by requiring probation officers to conduct law 
enforcement activities because probation officers have an inherent duty of assuring defendants 
compliance with the conditions imposed by their sentences).   
104 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that religion-neutrals law of 
general applicability need not to be justified under the strict scrutiny test, even if such law have 
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice). 
105 Id. at 874. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
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practice.109  
As response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).110  RFRA had two main purposes. First, Congress 
wanted to supersede Smith and restored the compelling interest test by recognized that religion-
neutral laws could burden a person’s religious exercise as much as a facially discriminatory 
one.111  Second, Congress wanted to provide a claim or defense to those whose religious exercise 
is substantially burdened by the Government.112  
RFRA prohibits the “Government” from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of 
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.113  However, in enacting 
RFRA, Congress carved an exception by providing that laws of general applicability that 
substantially burdens a person’s religion may nonetheless be constitutional if the Government 
can show that application of the law to the person’s religion (1) furthers a compelling 
Government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
interest.114 
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of RFRA in the 
case of City of Boerne v. Flores.115  In Boerne, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional 
as applied to the States finding that Congress exceeded its remedial authority under section 5 of 
                     
109 Id. at 886. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
111 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-a(4) and b(1). 
112 § 2000bb-2(2). 
113 § 2000bb-1(a). 
114 § 2000bb-1(b); See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
126 S. Ct. 1211 (U.S. 2006) (applying RFRA’s compelling test to strike down the 
Government’s claim of compelling interest in a case addressing the use of hallucinogen 
by a religious group). 
 
115 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (addressing a dispute over a zoning board 
denial of a building permit to a church and holding RFRA to be unconstitutional as applied to the 
states).   
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the Fourteenth Amendment.116  The Supreme Court holding in Boerne is silent as to RFRA’s 
constitutionality as applied to federal law.  Since Congress’ power to regulate in the federal 
sphere arises from its enumerated powers under Article I and not from its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority, courts have found that Boerne does not apply to the federal 
Government.117   
 
V.  The shattering of a solid rock:  An argument against the constitutionality of the 
DNA Act, as enforced by the federal Government, if challenged by a religious 
objector as a violation of his Free Exercise right under RFRA 
 
Undisputably, any defendant challenging the DNA Act or its analogous state statutes 
would be “faced with a tidal wave of authority against [his] position [because] [e]very court of 
review that has decided the issue has upheld the DNA testing statute[s].”118   Indeed, the DNA 
Act has been challenged and upheld under many constitutional theories.119  However, there is no 
reported or unreported decision fully addressing whether or not the Federal DNA Act, as 
enforced by the Program, would survive muster under RFRA’s strict scrutiny test if challenged 
by a qualified offender whose religious beliefs prohibits him from “giving” blood.120 
                     
116 Id. at 512, 534-35.   
117 See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 
1120 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001) (the Supreme Court invalidated 
RFRA only as applied to state and local law, not as applied to the federal Government); 
See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 
(U.S. 2006) (applying RFRA’s compelling test to strike down the Government’s claim of 
compelling interest in a case addressing the use of hallucinogen by a religious group). 
118 See People v. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1004-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (upholding Illinois 
DNA statute). 
119 See section III of this article, supra, for a discussion of the challenges that has been raised 
against the DNA Act. 
120 This writer has been unable to find any case law addressing whether or not the taking of blood 
could survive strict scrutiny under RFRA. This writer is aware, however, of the following 
relevant cases: U.S. v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing defendant’s claim at the 
initial stage of a RFRA’s inquiry for failure to show that forbidding blood sample was a central 
tenet of his religion), United States v. Holmes, No. CR.S-02-349-DFL (E.D.Cal. filed Oct. 13, 
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The DNA Act neither specifies nor precludes a particular method for collecting a 
qualified offender’s DNA.  In fact, the Act only requires the collection of a “DNA sample.”  
Under the DNA Act, a “DNA sample” is defined as “a tissue, fluid or other bodily sample of an 
individual on which DNA analysis can be carried out.”121  However, in enforcing the federal 
DNA Act, the Program has only validated protocols for the collection and analysis of whole 
blood samples.122  
In United States v. Kincade, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that its constitutional analysis 
of the DNA Act was limited to “the program before [them], as it is designed and as it has been 
implemented.”123  At the beginning of its opinion, the court recognized that the Program, as 
implemented, requires blood samples.  The following excerpt further clarifies this point: 
[b]ecause the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“the Bureau”) 
considers DNA information derived from blood samples to be 
more reliable than that obtained from other sources (in part 
because blood is easier to test and to preserve than hair, saliva, or 
skin cells), Bureau guidelines require those in federal custody and 
subject to the DNA Act (“qualified offenders”) to submit to 
compulsory blood sampling.124 
 
                                                                  
2005) (challenging Federal DNA Act on religious belief grounds which as of Nov. 25, 2006, has 
not been adjudicated by the court), United States v. Lamo, No. CR.  S-05-022-FCD (E.D.Cal. 
filed May 9, 2006) (same), United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821, n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(addressing the DNA Act under the Forth Amendment and acknowledging, without addressing it, 
that an application of the DNA Act to persons holding sincere religious objections may 
potentially raised free exercise issues), Yusov v. Martinez, 2000 WL 1593387 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(granting probation officer’s motion to dismiss parolee’s civil suit seeking to preclude the 
collection from him of any form of bodily sample for inclusion in the state’s DNA database 
pursuant to NY DNA statute for failure to state a claim under the First Amendment).  While 
Brown, Holmes, Lamo, Kincade and Yusov may be instructive, they are certainly not dispositive 
of this particular issue. 
121 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(1). 
122 See note 32 supra. 
123 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). 
124 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924, 
(acknowledging that the FBI guidelines require those subject to the DNA Act to submit to a 
compulsory blood sampling because the FBI considers DNA information derived from blood 
samples to be more reliable than that obtained from other sources).   
 24
Even though the FBI requires the extraction of blood as the DNA sample to be 
collected under the Program, the extraction of blood is prohibited under the doctrine of at 
least one religion, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses.125     
a. Meeting the sincerity threshold:  A Jehovah’s Witness’ perspective on 
Blood & Religion 
 
In determining a religious belief the court will not look into the ‘truth’ of a belief,126 
because “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others 
in order to merit… protection.”127   Guided by these limitations, the function of the court is to 
determine whether the person holds an honest conviction that such activity is forbidden by his 
religion.128  This is the “threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”129 
A claimant meets this initial burden if he or she proves that the beliefs are truly held and 
religious in nature.130 
In United States v. Brown, Brown was arrested for rape and kidnapping.131  After 
Brown’s indictment, the Government moved for production of his blood sample for DNA 
testing.132  Brown objected arguing that the extraction of blood sample would violate his right to 
                     
125 Being that there are “approximately two million Jehovah’s Witnesses living in the United 
States,” for purposes of this paper, we will limit our analysis to the Jehovah’s Witnesses doctrine 
on blood.  See In re Petition to Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse Investigation, 875 A.2d 
365, 370 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2005). 
126 Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir.1987) (internal citations omitted).   
127 Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
128 Id. at 716. 
129 Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).  
130 Id. 
131 U.S. v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing defendant’s claim at the first 
stage of a RFRA inquiry for failure to show that forbidding blood samples is in conflict with 
God’s stated principles under the Jehovah's Witness religion). 
132 Id.  
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religious freedom as a Jehovah’s Witness under both RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution.133   
During the evidentiary hearing, the court evaluated the evidence presented by the parties.  
First, the court heard testimony from Brown regarding his religious belief.  Second, the court 
heard testimony from both an Elder134 and an administrator of a local Jehovah’s Witness 
congregation who contradicted Brown’s testimony.135  Finally, the court heard from an FBI agent 
who testified as to the importance of obtaining Brown’s blood sample for law enforcement.136   
The court granted the involuntary collection of the blood sample finding that Brown 
failed to meet his initial threshold because he did not show that he holds a belief that was honest 
and religious in nature.137  In affirming, the Eight Circuit pointed out the fact that one of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses publications, submitted by Brown as evidence, stated “tests involving an 
individual’s own blood are not so clearly in conflict with God’s stated principles.”138  For the 
Brown court, Brown’s religious objection as a Jehovah’s Witness was insufficient to prevent 
collection of his blood.   
After Brown, it can be suggested that a Jehovah’s Witnesses claim for exemption as 
conscious religious objector will be weak.  However, Brown, even though instructive, is not 
dispositive as to whether or not a Jehovah’s Witness can prove that the extraction and storage of 
his blood for law enforcement purposes is prohibited by his religion and that he sincerely 
believes so.  Two main reasons support this position.  First, the court did not consider the 
emergent powerful movement inside of the Jehovah’s Witnesses that has created conflicts among 
                     
133 Id.  
134 An elder is a spiritually mature man appointed to teach the congregation, according to the 
Jehovah’s Witness doctrine. 
135 U.S. v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 2003). 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 1076. 
138 Id. at 1077, n.3.  
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its members as to whether or not blood should be given or received.139  Second, the Brown court 
never addressed the issue of whether or not the Government can meet RFRA’s strict scrutiny test 
once a Jehovah’s Witness meets the prima facie case.140  Observe that the court dismissed 
Brown’s claim during the first stage of a RFRA claim and, therefore, did not entertain the issue 
further.   
As a result, what we can learn from Brown is that a Jehovah’s Witness, who sincerely 
beliefs that blood shall not be given, will be able to meet his initial burden if he can show, using 
the correct evidence, that his beliefs are truly held and religious in nature based on a doctrine of 
his religion.141   Once he meets that burden, it is unlikely that the court will consider whether the 
beliefs make sense or not.   To that extent, the Supreme Court has clearly stated “religious beliefs 
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit … 
protection.”142  
Over the past five decades, the Watchtower Society143 has shown some shifts in their 
policy on blood and medicine.144  These shifts in policy can be attributed to the significant 
                     
139 The Associated Jehovah’s Witnesses for Reform on Blood is a an anonymous organization 
with the objective “to educate Jehovah’s Witnesses… regarding … the irrational aspects of the 
Watchtower Society’s policy on the use of blood … and to promote reform of the Watchtower’s 
policy so that each Jehovah’s Witness can have a free and informed choice regarding their health 
care - without fear of control or sanctions from the Watchtower Society (and member 
congregations) that can separate them from their family members and friends.” See 
www.ajwr.org/about (last visited November 30, 2006) (emphasis added).  
140 A prima facie case is shown when application of the challenged law “would (1) substantially 
burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1219 (2006). 
141 See generally Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987). 
142 Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
143 Watchtower Society is the legal organization in charge of interpreting the beliefs, teachings, 
and activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. See official website www.watchtower.org. 
144 See, e.g., Opposition to blood Transfusion, http://www.religioustolerance.org/witness5.htm 
(“In 1967, [Watchtower Society] said that organ transplants [were] form of cannibalism and 
[were] to be shunned.  [Watchtower Society] reversed this decision in 1980 and made transplants 
as matter of personal conscience… an unknown number of Jehovah’s Witnesses had died … 
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number of Jehovah’s Witnesses who either openly or anonymously have expressed disagreement 
with the Watchtower Society’s blood policy.145  
The most recent Watchtower policy on blood said that “when it comes to fractions of any 
of the primary [blood] components, each Christian, after careful and prayerful meditation, must 
conscientiously decide for himself.”146  Thus, this policy seems to shift the decision to the 
individual but only after the individual exercised “careful and prayerful meditation.”147  
However, this new policy, as well as the movement in favor of a reform on blood policy, has 
nothing to do with giving blood for law enforcement purpose, but for health care purposes. 148  
Still, one of the tenets of the Jehovah’s Witness doctrine is that “the Bible clearly indicates that 
blood is sacred and is not to be used for human consumption.”149   
When it comes to the use, disposition, or storage of blood “Christians face a very serious 
decision. They must carefully and prayerfully meditate on Bible principles concerning the 
sacredness of blood. With a keen desire to maintain a good relationship with Jehovah, 
each must be guided by his Bible-trained conscience.”150   It is due to a peculiar understanding of 
scripture, specifically in the Old Testament, that “members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses regard 
themselves commanded by God to neither give nor receive … blood.”151  In the Jehovah’s 
                                                                  
because they had refused available transplants.”) (last visited November 29, 2006).  
145 See note 139 supra. 
146 The Watchtower, October 15, 2000, pages 29-31. 
147 Id. 
148 See note 139 supra (one of the Associated Jehovah’s Witnesses for Reform on Blood 
objective is to promote reform so that each Jehovah’s Witness can have a free and informed 
choice regarding their health care) (emphasis added). 
149 Religious Tolerance.Org, Jehovah’s Witnesses Opposition to Blood Transfusions, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/witness5.htm (quoting L.C. Cotton, associate director of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Hospital Information Services).  
150 What Are Hemoglobin-Based Oxygen Carriers?,  Sidebar, Awake! p. 10. (Aug. 2006).  
151 See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ill. 1965)  (holding that Jehovah’s Witness’ 
woman, who did not have minor children to be cared for, can refuse to receive blood 
transfusion). 
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Witness’ doctrine, blood has a symbolic and important meaning: 
[Blood] stood for life provided by the Creator. By treating blood as 
special, the people showed dependence on him for life. Yes, the 
chief reason why they were not to take in blood was, not that it was 
unhealthy, but that it had special meaning to God.152 
 
Many authors have written books explaining the Bible.  A great number of them agreed 
with the proposition that many Biblical teachings of blood dictate the way in which Jehovah’s 
Witnesses view its usage.  Indeed, “[t]he Bible shows that blood is more than a complex biologic 
fluid. It mentions blood over 400 times.”153    
In relevant parts, the Book of Genesis states “your blood of your souls shall I ask back; 
Anyone shedding man’s blood, by man will his own blood be shed, for in God’s image he made 
man.”154  Genesis also commands, “do not spill blood.”155  The following excerpt further explain 
the readings of the above verses:   
[b]oth in vss. 4-5 and in vs. 6 [of the Book of Genesis] a sacred 
quality is ascribed to blood.  [B]lood was considered in a primitive 
anthropology to be the sign and source of life, therefore taboo to 
man and reserved to God.  In the later legislation (Leviticus 17:10-
14, P) the law was spelt out in considerable detail.  Here in Genesis 
a somewhat surprising explanation is given why if anyone sheds 
the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.  The explanation 
is not … that a quid pro quo is demanded…. Instead, it is because 
in the image of God, has man been made.156    
 
 
“The Bible tells Christians to ‘abstain from blood’”157 because “blood is the soul.”158   
                     
152 See Watchtower, Blood – Vital for life,  
http://www.watchtower.org/e/hb/index.htm?article=article_07.htm  (last visited November 
2006). 
153 Id.  
154 See New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, The Book of Genesis, 9:005, 06 
respectively.  
155 Id. at 37:22. 
156 Bruce Vawter, On Genesis: A new reading 133 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. NY 1977).  
157 See Watchtower, I accept God’s view of blood,   
http://www.watchtower.org/library/g/2003/12/8/article_01.htm  (last visited November 2006). 
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[A Jehovah’s Witness] cannot drain from [their] body part of that 
blood, which represents [their] life, and still love God with [their] 
whole soul, because [by giving their blood, they] have taken away 
part of [their] soul  -[their] blood - and given it to someone else …  
any violation of the law on blood [is] a serious sin against God, 
and God himself would call the law violator to account.159  
 
For many Jehovah’s Witnesses, God’s law on blood is not to be ignored.  Even in 
situations where life-threatening emergencies arises, many Jehovah’s Witnesses adhere to the 
belief that “the Creator’s ban on taking in blood to sustain life …. Hence, precious as life is, our 
Life-Giver never said that his standards could be ignored in an emergency.”160  In fact, every 
year, many Jehovah’s Witnesses give their lives and vehemently affirms their believes by 
rejecting the taking or giving of blood-based products.161     
Based on the above discussion, a qualified Jehovah’s Witness offender (“religious 
objector”) may be able to successfully show that giving blood is prohibited by his religions and 
that he holds a sincere belief that blood should not be given.  Once he is able to meet this 
threshold, he prevents the court from dismissing his claim and forces it to continue the inquiry 
under RFRA.     
 
b. The substantial burden threshold: Does requiring a Jehovah’s Witness, 
who sincerely believes that blood is sacred and cannot be given, to submit 
to a blood sample for DNA profiling purposes substantially burden his 
religious belief? 
 
                                                                  
158 See New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, Deuteronomy 12:23. 
159 See note 151 supra.  
160 See note 152 supra.  
161 For examples of Jehovah’s Witnesses who do not accept blood transfusion not even in life-
risk situations see Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Circ. 1991) (Jehovah’s Witness woman died 
after refusing blood transfusion, including transfusion of her own blood), In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 
322 (Ill. 1989) (17-year-old Jehovah's Witness with leukemia allowed to make decision 
regarding refusal of blood transfusion as a mature minor even though the age of majority in 
Illinois is 18); see also note 151 supra. 
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Once the religious objector meets the initial threshold question of sincerity, the court 
would be bound to entertain whether or not the taking of blood, using the finger stick testing, as 
applied to him, substantially burdens his religious belief under RFRA.162   Under RFRA, the 
Government shall not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability.”163  Evaluating whether or not a particular 
Government action substantially burdens someone’s religion is not a simple determination.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized this task to be difficult to contest because not all the burdens 
imposed on a religion are unconstitutional.164   To be unconstitutional, the burden “must be more 
than an inconvenience”165 it must be substantial, and the person claiming adherence to the 
religion has the burden to prove that the statute “puts substantial pressure on and adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs including when, if enforced, it results in the choice 
to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.”166  
Arguably, subjecting a Jehovah’s Witness to provide a blood sample can be characterized 
as not interfering with his ability to attend religious services, pray, or fulfill his religious duties; 
after all, the blood test is a one-time procedure and does not involve an ongoing future restriction 
of the Jehovah’s Witness’ ability to exercise his religion.  However, the analysis cannot be 
superficial. 
                     
162 Note that in Brown, the defendant was unable to meet the sincerity threshold the court never 
had the opportunity to address whether or not the taking of blood for DNA profiling substantially 
burdened his religious belief. See Brown, note 31 supra. 
163 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 
(2006) (applying RFRA’s compelling test to strike down the Government’s claim of 
compelling interest in a case addressing the use of hallucinogen by a religious group). 
 (internal citations omitted). 
164 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
165 Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2000).     
166 Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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By requiring collection of blood from a Jehovah’s Witness, the Program is requiring from 
him to “modify” his behavior and to “violate” his belief, the exact conduct that RFRA 
prohibits.167  As explained earlier, for many Jehovah’s Witnesses a violation of God’s law on 
blood is a serious sin against God, and God himself will hold the violator accountable.168  
Moreover, the Program forces and pressures a Jehovah’s Witness to choose between the law of 
God and man’s made law.  While man-made law will subject him to criminal prosecution for 
violating the law,169 God’s law will punish him and make him accountable to God.  Therefore, 
by placing the Jehovah’s Witness in a position where he must choose between his beliefs or 
criminal prosecution, the Program substantially burdens his religious beliefs.170  
 
c. The Strict Scrutiny analysis: Is the Program’s mandatory collection of 
blood for DNA testing a compelling Government interest and the least 
intrusive means of advancing that interest? 
 
Once the Jehovah’s Witness has been able to state a prima facie case171 the 
inquiry is not over.  RFRA “essentially requires the Government to justify any regulation 
imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion by showing that the 
regulation satisfies strict scrutiny.”172  As the Supreme Court recently explained:  
RFRA and its strict scrutiny test contemplate an inquiry more focused than 
[a] Government’s categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to 
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through 
                     
167 Id.   
168 See note 151 supra.  
169 The failure to provide DNA sample violates two mandatory release conditions:  not commit 
another federal, state, or local offense; and submit to DNA sampling.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(1)&(8).   
170 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (a law causes a substantial burden “if it results 
in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal 
prosecution.”).  
171 See note 140 supra.  
172 Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 
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application of the challenged law “to the person”--- the particular  
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially 
burdened.173 
 
Thus, the Government may substantially burden a Jehovah’s Witness’ exercise of 
religion if it can clearly demonstrate that application of the burden to him is in 
furtherance of a compelling Government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling Government interest.174   
i.   The Government wants your blood: The showing of a compelling   
Government interest 
 
The Government has the burden to prove that the Program, as it is, is in furtherance of a 
compelling Government interest.175  In determining whether the Government has a compelling 
interest in a particular regulation, the courts look at the “importance of the value underlying the 
regulation.”176    
As discussed earlier, the DNA Act has been challenged and overwhelmingly upheld.  As 
such, states and federal courts have identified a plethora of arguments to show and support the 
Government’s compelling interest. This section will briefly discuss the some of the three most 
compelling interests commonly identified by the courts. 
 
 Compelling Government interest: to solve crimes using DNA databases 
The Government has a compelling interest in using CODIS to solve crimes and 
“bring closure to countless victims of crime who long have languished in the knowledge 
                     
173 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1220 
(U.S. 2006) (applying RFRA’s compelling test to strike down the Government’s claim of 
compelling interest in a case addressing the use of hallucinogen by a religious group). 
174 Id. at 1217.    
175 Id. at 1219. 
176 Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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that perpetrators remain at large.”177  CODIS’s success depends on both timely collection 
and accurate analysis of DNA samples because “[u]ltimately, the success of the CODIS 
program will be measured by the crimes it helps to solve. . . .  As of September 2006, 
CODIS has produced over 36,800 hits assisting in more than 39,200 investigations.”178  
 
 Compelling Government interest: to protect society by preventing crimes  
Protecting society and its citizens from crimes is a compelling Government interest.  
Including a felon’s DNA profile in the database serves the goal of preventing or at least 
discouraging the individual to commit other offenses.   
According to a study completed by the National Institute of Justice 
the average rapist commits 8-12 sexual assaults. If law 
enforcement could immediately apprehend the rapist after the first 
sexual offense, then a minimum of 7 rapes would be prevented per 
offender…. DNA database requirements significantly impact the 
number and frequency of rapes and other repeat violent crimes in 
this country.179 
 
  Courts have recognized that the recidivism rate of supervisees is “astounding.”180    In 
fact “out of 108,580 persons released from prisons in 11 States in 1983, an estimated 62.5% were 
rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within 3 years, 46.8% were reconvicted, and 
                     
177 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004). 
178 Measuring Success, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/success.htm (last visited December 
2006). For an interesting discussion of the most notables crimes solved by DNA evidence see 
also Frederick R. Bibier, Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of 
Forensic DNA Data Bank Programs, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 222, 225 (Summer 2006). 
179 See Benefits of Expanding criminal DNA database,  
http://www.dnaresource.info/documents/reasonsforexpansion.pdf (last visited October 2006). 
180 See note 177 supra. But see U.S. v. Miles, 228, F.Supp.2d 1130, 1139 (E.D.Cal. 2002) 
(finding that Government’s interest in reducing recidivism is collateral to the law enforcement 
purposes of the Act and that the Act’s legislative history does not reflect that Congress was 
overwhelmingly concerned with deterring convicted felons from committing crime in the future). 
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41.4% returned to prison or jail.”181  
The interest in reducing recidivism is in line with the core purposes of supervised release: 
rehabilitating convicted offenders and protecting society by deterring recidivism.   
 
 
 Compelling Government interest: To exonerate the Innocent   
 
Government interest in ensuring that innocent people are not wrongfully convicted is 
compelling.182  An accurate DNA profile can help clarify whether or not a person was at a crime 
scene.     
 
DNA evidence is like “the finger of God.” In more than one 
hundred cases over the past twelve years, DNA evidence has been 
utilized in the postconviction stage to prove “beyond any doubt” 
that the convicted individual never committed the crime. Those 
cases demonstrate that DNA evidence can exonerate a defendant, 
even when innocence is not expected, who the criminal justice 
system has erroneously convicted.183      
 
  Even though including an individual’s DNA in the database may have the effect of 
inculpating him, it may also have the effect of exonerating him and “the interest in accurate 
criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling interest that the DNA Act can 
reasonably be said to advance.”184  
In sum, the Government’s compelling interest under the DNA Act is further justified 
because the Act only applies to “federal convicted offenders of a qualified offense,” and not to 
the general population.185  Courts have consistently held that felons “do not enjoy the absolute 
                     
181 Allen J. Beck & Bernard E. Shipley, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf (last visited December 2006). 
182 United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2005). 
183 Eunyung Theresa Oh, Innocence After “Guilt”: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents 
Who Pled Guilty, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 161, 162 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
184 See note 182 ante. 
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (requiring the collection of DNA sample only from those who had 
been convicted of certain federal crimes and who were incarcerated, or on parole, probation, or 
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liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”186  Indeed, “[as] to convicted persons, there is no 
question but that the state’s interest extends to maintaining a permanent record of identity to be 
used as an aid in solving past and future crimes, and this interest overcomes any privacy rights 
the individual might retain.”187 
Based on the above discussion, the Government may be able to meet its burden of 
showing a compelling interest under the first prong of RFRA’s strict scrutiny test.   
 
ii.   Shattering the rock: A proposed argument to support the failure of the 
Program under the “least intrusive” prong of RFRA’s Strict Scrutiny test 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the Government must shoulder a heavy burden 
to defend a regulation affecting religious actions [because] the challenged regulation must be 
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.”188  Because almost any law 
can be related to a genuine Government concern, the “least restrictive” inquiry is the critical test 
of the Free Exercise analysis.189    
The least restrictive test forces the courts to “measure the importance of a regulation by 
ascertaining the marginal benefit of applying it to all individuals, rather than to all individuals 
                                                                  
supervised released). 
186 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001) (upholding officer’s search of 
probationer’s apartment because it was supported by reasonable suspicion without deciding 
“whether the probation condition so diminished or completely eliminated [the probationer’s] 
reasonable expectation of privacy [to the extent that] a search by a law enforcement officer 
without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
187 People v. King, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1374 (Cal. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 950 
(2001); See also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (“A broad range of choices that might 
infringe constitutional rights in a free society falls within the expected conditions ... of those who 
have suffered a lawful conviction.”). 
188 Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1984). 
189 Id.  
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except those holding a conflicting religious conviction.”190  Generally, a “least restrictive” 
inquiry follows the following analysis:  
If the compelling state goal can be accomplished despite the 
exemption of a particular individual, then a regulation which 
denies an exemption is not the least restrictive means of furthering 
the state interest. A synthesis of the two prongs is therefore the 
question whether the Government has a compelling interest in not 
exempting a religious individual from a particular regulation.191  
 
 
It is indisputable that DNA testing advances each of the Government’s compelling 
interest because of its “ability to match DNA profiles derived from crime scene evidence to 
DNA profiles in an existing data bank.”192  But, is the collection of “blood” the least intrusive 
means of obtaining a DNA sample from a federal convicted offender whose religious beliefs 
prohibits him from “giving” blood?  Would the Government’s compelling interests be 
undermined if buccal swabs is given in lieu of blood? Each of these questions should be 
answered in the negative for the reasons stated below.  
First, the DNA Act, as enacted and as it is currently enforced, neither requires nor 
precludes the use of a particular method of collecting the DNA samples.  In fact, the Act only 
requires collection of a “DNA sample,” and defines “DNA sample” as “a tissue, fluid or other 
bodily sample of an individual on which DNA analysis can be carried out.”193   Congress’ broad 
definition of a “DNA sample” recognizes that “[o]nly one-tenth of a single percent of DNA 
(about 3 million bases) differs from one person to the next . . . and a DNA profile of an 
individual [can be generated by] using samples from blood, bone, hair, [etc.].”194 
                     
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 1272-1273. 
192 People v. King, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1375-1376 (Cal. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 
950 (2001). 
193 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(c)(1). 
194 Human Genome Project, How is DNA typing done? 
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Second, there are other least intrusive means available.  The FBI’s decision to collect 
whole blood was based on the result of a series of studies that concluded in 1998.195  However, 
these studies are obsolete; it has been eight (8) years since then.  With today’s technology, DNA 
samples from Buccal swabs provides the same quantity and quality as a DNA sample from 
blood.   
Furthermore, in enforcing similar DNA statutes, every state provides less intrusive means 
to collect DNA samples.  For example, the state of New York uses buccal swab as their primary 
means of securing a DNA specimen from designated offenders.196  New York uses the buccal 
swab because “it is less intrusive, less expensive, and much easier to administer and to process in 
the laboratory.”197  In California, buccal samples are the primary method of collecting DNA 
samples for California’s Data Bank Program.198  California adopted buccal swabs in January 
2005 “in the interest of financial cost and public health.”199  In Michigan, only blood samples 
were collected. Today, however, buccal swabs are the most common method.200 
 Fourth, the fact that the Program cannot process buccal swabs samples for lack of 
validated protocols is not controlling.  What is important here is the fact that the FBI, as a whole, 
does have the capacity to either validate protocols for the analysis of samples other than blood or 
to analyze and create DNA profiles from samples other than blood.    
                                                                  
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml#1 (last visited 
November 2006).  
195 See note 30 supra. 
196 See New York State, Division of State Police, New DNA Collection Method, 
http://www.troopers.state.ny.us/Forensic%5FScience/DNA/New%5FCollection%5FMethod/ 
(last visited October 2006). 
197 Id. 
198 See Office of the Attorney General, http://ag.ca.gov (last visited October 2006). 
199 Id. 
200  See, e.g., Whatman Laboratories, http://www.whatman.com/repository/documents/s7/04-
WGP-145_ForensicsBrochure%20FINAL%20040604.pdf. 
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 In the FBI, forensic DNA identification analysis is divided in two different programs: 
the Forensic Casework and the Convicted Offender Analysis.  Even though the FBI has not 
validated protocols for the analysis of other samples for its Convicted Offender Program, it has 
for its Forensic Casework.   In fact, the FBI forensic laboratory analyzes and generates DNA 
profiles from samples “in body fluids, stains, and other biological tissues… and compare [them] 
with the results of DNA analysis of known samples [to] associate victims(s) and/or suspect(s) 
with each other or with a crime scene.”201    
 The FBI justified its adoption of different standards as “an acknowledgment of the 
differences in the nature or type of sample, the typical sample quantity and potential for 
reanalysis, and specialization that may exist in a laboratory.”202  This justification, however, is 
not persuasive.  The FBI justification lacks merit in the light of a religious objector claim, the 
fact that every state do process other samples for the enforcement of similar state statutes and the 
fact that the FBI does have the capacity to either validate new protocols or to analyze DNA 
samples other than blood.   
 Finally, all Government’s compelling purposes can be accomplished if an 
exception is granted.   Allowing the religious objector to provide his DNA sample 
through buccal swab or any other sample from which his DNA profile can be obtained in 
lieu of blood, does not undermine any of the Government’s purposes nor affect the 
Government’s ability to administer the program effectively and efficiently.203  To the 
contrary, by submitting his DNA profile through buccal swabs, the individual’s religious 
                     
201 FBI Laboratory Division, Handbook of Forensic Services 33-34 (2003 revised edition). 
202 See FBI, Standards for Convicted Offenders Labs, introduction, 
htp://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/offender.htm. 
203 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (denying Amish claim that the paying 
of tax burdens his religious belief, among others, because accommodating the belief would 
defeat the taxation system). 
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beliefs will not be burdened and each of the Government’s compelling interests will be 
fully satisfied because his DNA profile will be included in the CODIS database and as 
such it will help to solve and prevent crimes as well as to exonerate the innocent.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
DNA evidence has been proved to be an indispensable tool for state, local, and federal 
law enforcement.   However, as discussed in the preceding sections, it is unlikely that the 
mandatory collection of whole blood as required by the Program would survive strict scrutiny if 
challenged by a qualified religious objector because the collection of blood is not the least 
intrusive means by which the Government’s compelling interests can be achieved.204 
 
 
                     
204 Currently, there is an effort to expand DNA statutes to require collection from all arrestees in 
the United States.  See DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, S. 1606, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005) 
(Introduced in Senate, currently referred to the Committee on the Judiciary) available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:8:./temp/~c109qmkI06::. However, based on the 
factual scenario presented in this paper, the result will still be the same unless the FBI decides to 
either switch or incorporate other methods for the collection of DNA samples.  
